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November 3, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Subject: Revised course of action in the contingency that a surveillance plane is shot at or destroyed

1. The importance and legitimacy of surveillance should be a constant theme in our public and private discussions of the Cuban problem, to build understanding at all levels of the contribution which such surveillance is making to the reduction of danger.
2. In the event one of our surveillance planes is shot at or destroyed, we should first establish the facts beyond any reasonable doubt.
3. In the case of an attack on a low level flight, the President should send an urgent message to Khrushchev stating that we will be obliged to retaliate immediately in the event of any further attack on our planes and ask that he urge the Cubans immediately to cease such attacks. The President would inform Khrushchev that our action would be limited to that necessary to enable our surveillance to continue.
4. If there were an attack on a U-2 by a SAM site, we should probably assume that this is a deliberate Soviet decision. In this case, we should arrange for a message from the President to Khrushchev to be delivered, as nearly as possible simultaneously with an attack on the SAM site concerned. The message to Khrushchev would explain the vital necessity of continuing aerial surveillance pending establishment of other arrangements, would refer to Kuznetsov's repeated statement to McCloy on October 31 (USUN 158. to State) that all antiaircraft in Cuba is in Cuban hands, and state that the action taken would be limited to that necessary to enable us to continue surveillance.

(Alternatively, we could deliver a message and reserve the attack until we have heard Khrushchev's answer.)

By the National Security Council
under provisions of E.O. 12065

by 2. Brzezinski

same as F 88-627, #42

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5. In both cases, the CAS would be informed of our intended action as far as possible in advance, without request for an endorsement. It would be advisable to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations of our action and the reason for it.
6. In either case we should announce to the public that one of our planes has been shot at or destroyed and indicate the nature of the position we were communicating to the Soviet Union.
7. If it becomes necessary to act to defend our surveillance planes, the specific action taken would depend upon the circumstances of the interference. If a U-2 has been shot down, the appropriate action would be first to eliminate the particular SAM site or sites responsible for the action, then to communicate a second time with Moscow, and finally, in the absence of satisfactory assurances, eliminate the remainder of the SAM system. If MIGs are involved in an isolated incident, the appropriate action would be against MIGs whether in the air or on airfields. If short-range anti-aircraft were responsible, this would presumably be action by Cubans not Russians, and action directly against those positions would be appropriate.
8. After evaluation of Soviet and Cuban counter-action to any actions under paragraph 7 above, we might proceed to wider action, and such wider action might include approaches to allied and friendly governments in an effort to prevent all shipments to Cuba, or, if all else failed, a reimposition and expansion of the quarantine. (Ambassador Thompson emphasizes that a renewal of the quarantine against the Soviet Union at such a stage would almost certainly require strenuous reaction from Moscow.)

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Mr. Nitze
9 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Revised Course of Action in the Contingency that a Surveillance Plane is Shot at or Destroyed

1. The importance and legitimacy of surveillance should be a constant theme in our public and private discussions of the Cuban problem, to build understanding at all levels of the contribution which such surveillance is making to the reduction of danger.
2. In the event one of our surveillance planes is shot at or destroyed, we should first establish the facts beyond any reasonable doubt.
3. In the case of an unsuccessful attack by anti-aircraft artillery or by fighters, the President should send an urgent message to Khrushchev stating that we will be obliged to retaliate immediately in the event of any further attack on our planes and ask that he urge the Cubans immediately to cease such attacks.
4. In case one of our aircraft is shot down by fighters in an isolated incident the appropriate action would be against HIGs whether in the air or on airfields. In case one of our aircraft is shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, there should be a prompt retaliation against these positions. In either of the above cases, it would be presumed that the action was by Cubans, not by Russians.
5. If there were an attack, successful or unsuccessful, against one of our surveillance aircraft by a SAM as an isolated incident, we should eliminate the particular SAM site or sites responsible for the action.

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6. In the contingencies covered in paragraphs 4 or 5, we should arrange for a message from the President to Khrushchev to be delivered as nearly as possible simultaneously with the attack. The message to Khrushchev would explain the vital necessity of continuing aerial surveillance pending establishment of other arrangements, would refer to Kuznetsov's statement to McGloay on October 31 (USUM 1581 to State) that all anti-aircraft in Cuba is in Cuban hands, and state that the action taken was necessary to enable us to continue surveillance.

7. In all three contingencies covered in paragraphs 3, 4 or 5, the UN would be informed of our intended action as far as possible in advance, without request for an endorsement. It would be advisable to inform the NATO Council and the Secretary General of the UN of our action and the reason for it. In all cases we should announce to the public what had happened, the action we have taken, and the nature of the position we were communicating to the USSR.

3. The foregoing discussion refers to an isolated incident which does not indicate a general intention on the part of Soviet or Cuban authorities to resist U.S. air surveillance. If the latter situation arises, it will be necessary to proceed to wider action. Such wider action would include one or all of the following actions: (1) an extensive elimination of Cuban air defenses; (2) attacks against the IL-28's; (3) a reposition and expansion of the quarantine to complete blockade.

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